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BALANCING GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY AND THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
EXECUTIVE BRANCH "HOUSEKEEPING"
REGULATIONS AND CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS'
RIGHTS TO A CONSTITUTIONALLY FAIR TRIALt
James F. Ponsoldt*

The twentieth century has witnessed a revolutionary
expansion in the state's sphere of competence accompanied by a concomitant increase in its effective power.
Permeating all areas of endeavor, its activities and
spokesmen too frequently exalt the desideratum of efficiency at the expense of values which, at least in the
constitutional order, ought to be of paramount and
guiding influence.I
Introduction
Three Justices dissented from the Supreme Court's recent
denial of certiorari in Taliaferro v. Maryland,2 which challenged
the validity of a Maryland Rule of Criminal Procedure authortThe author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Amelie Waller,

a member of the District of Columbia Bar.

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1972; A.B., Cornell University, 1968.
'R. Walker, The Constitutional and Legal Development of Habeas Corpus
as the Writ of Liberty 7 (1960).
2103 S.Ct. 2114 (1983). Justices White, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented.
The Maryland Court of Appeals had affirmed petitioner's conviction by a 4-3
vote. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 456 A.2d 29 (1983). As framed by
Justice White, the case presented the question "whether the exclusion of a
witness merely for failure to abide by a discovery rule ... impermissibly
infringes upon a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to offer witnesses on his
behalf." 103 S. Ct. at 2114 (citations omitted).
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izing the trial judge to exclude highly exculpatory defense alibi
evidence because the defendant had failed to disclose the name
of the proposed witness to the prosecutor in a timely fashion.
Justice White's opinion for the dissenters recognized that the

policy favoring efficient prosecutorial and judicial administration, which is the basis for similar defense disclosure requirements and witness exclusion sanctions in thirty-five states, conflicts with the basic right of an accused to present a defense.'
Coincidentally, two weeks later in Federal Trade Commission v. GrolierInc. ,4 the Court unanimously held that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)5 and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 6 usually do not require a federal agency to disclose
intra-agency litigation memoranda to the public or to an adversary in litigation, regardless of when the memoranda were
drafted or how the information contained therein was developed. 7 The opinion recognized that exemptions from disclosure
3103 S. Ct. at 2115. Md. R. Proc. 741(d)(3) requires criminal defendants
to provide the state prior to trial with the name and address of each alibi
witness which the defendant intends to call at trial. Taliaferro attempted to
call an alibi witness on the second day of trial without having complied with
Rule 741. An alibi was his only defense. The trial court excluded the witness,
even though the state requested only a continuance, not witness exclusion.
Id. at 2114.
As Justice White's opinion noted, the Maryland Rule's sanction of excluding defense witnesses, like Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1, has never been upheld
by the Supreme Court, has been rejected by the Fifth Circuit, United States
v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1981), and has been criticized by several
commentators. See 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 11-4.7(a) and
accompanying commentary (2d ed. 1980); Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913 (7th
Cir. 1982); Note, Preclusion of a Defendant's Alibi Testimony for Failure to
Provide PretrialNotice of his Alibi Defense is Unconstitutionalin the Absence
of Evidence of Intentional Suppression of Alibi Evidence to Gain A Tactical
Advantage, 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 267 (1983).
4103 S. Ct. 2209 (1983). Interestingly, Justice White wrote the opinion for
the Court.
15
U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
6
1n particular, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), which had been amended in
1970 to "clarify the extent to which trial preparation materials [i.e., work
product] are discoverable in federal courts." 103 S. Ct. at 2213..
7
The specific issue addressed in Grolier was whether the FOIA included
an exemption from federal agency disclosure to the public for intra-agency
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under FOIA, particularly Exemption 5 regarding intra-agency
memoranda, were intended by Congress to be "as narrow as is
consistent with efficient Government operations," 8 but nevertheless indicated a need to "provide a categorical rule" broadly
restricting FOIA disclosure requirements. 9
The two opinions underscore, in their area of overlap,
a direct and growing conflict between the need for government efficiency and the protection of civil liberties. 0 Whereas
Taliaferro raises the issue of whether a trial court may use
procedural rules to restrict a criminal defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence of a general nature at his trial, Grolier
focuses upon the extent to which any person may obtain internally developed information from a federal agency, regardless
of the intended use of the information. The citizen's immediate
need and constitutional interest in utilizing information in order
memoranda generated in connection with litigation which has been terminated
at the time of the request for disclosure. 103 S. Ct. at 2211. In holding that
such litigation-generated memoranda remained protected from disclosure, the
Court provided alternative bases for supporting the refusal of the Federal
Trade Commission to disclose agency documents: a broad reading of the workproduct doctrine, Rule 26(b)(3), and a parallel reading of congressional intent
underlying the FOIA. 103 S. Ct. at 2213, 2214. Justices Brennan and Blackmun
agreed with the first rationale but found the second unpersuasive. 103 S. Ct.
at 2216-18.
8103 S. Ct. at 2212, quoting from S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess.
9 (1965). The particular provision of the FOIA at issue was 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)
(1982): "This section does not apply to matters that are ...(5) inter-agency
or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency ...."
9103 S. Ct. at 2215. The Court deemed even this categorical rule necessary
to further the Act's purpose "of expediting disclosure." Id. The rule, protecting
government secrecy under both the work-product doctrine and the FOIA,
relates to pretrial discovery in civil cases, not to trial disclosure in criminal
cases, and affects primarily "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney." 103 S.Ct. at 2213. Nevertheless, the decision
represents one recent step toward a rule of government secrecy.
I"The role of government efficiency underlies many recent judicial interpretations of the Freedom of Information Act. For a summary of recent cases,
see Nat'l L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 3, col. 1. For a broader look at the entire
question, see D. Yates, Bureaucratic Democracy: The Search for Democracy
and Efficiency in American Government (1982).
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to assure the integrity of a criminal trial, as in Taliaferro, and
the citizen's general right to obtain information possessed by
the executive branch of government to assure that government
remains democratically responsive, as in Grolier, each conflict
with the need for government efficiency. When the citizen's
immediate and constitutionally defined use for information possessed by the executive branch conflicts with the government's
interest in efficiency, the failure to comply with efficiency-promoting government regulations designed to regulate access to
that information creates substantial tension.
This Article addresses the issue of whether an accused
person should be entitled to obtain and use at trial relevant
government information or the testimony of government employees to prove his innocence, regardless of whether he has
revealed in advance to his adversary his intended use of that
information or the specific content of that testimony. Part I
describes the federal "housekeeping" statute and the Justice
Department's housekeeping regulations," which require that
"Housekeeping regulations are those internal rules promulgated by an
executive branch agency pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1982), see infra note 15,
to regulate the control of government property and employees. This Article
focuses primarily upon current Justice Department housekeeping regulations.
See ihfra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
Since the housekeeping regulations restrict disclosure of government information pursuant to "demand," including particularly a trial subpoena, they
do not apply directly to requests for information authorized by the FOIA,
which has its own procedural requirements. This Article therefore, will not
address possible constitutional challenges to the refusal of agencies such as
the Federal Trade Commission to disclose exculpatory investigation memoranda pursuant to a FOIA request by a person who is being prosecuted by
the Justice Department for a criminal antitrust violation. Such challenges were
not at issue in Grolier.Obviously, the use of the FOIA is an alternative method
to a trial subpoena for obtaining government information relevant to a criminal
trial. The premise of this Article is that a trial subpoena issued on behalf of a
criminal defendant, involving judicial enforcement of the defendant's compulsory process rights, should receive more deference in the balancing between the claims of government efficiency and the rights of the individual.
But see Hatch, infra note 14. As noted above, the societal interests underlying
the compulsory process clause overlap with but are not identical to the goals
of the FOIA. It follows that limitations upon those interests and goals sought
by the executive branch are similarly related.
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subpoenaed government employees not disclose evidence unless
the person seeking that evidence has first summarized the requested evidence in advance, explained its intended use, and
obtained permission from a designated official for its release.
Part II of the Article will identify inconsistent recent appellate
court decisions which have assessed the validity of the regulations and, more particularly, the validity of the exclusion of a
government witness when the defendant has not complied with
the regulations. Part III will analyze the regulations and their
background in greater depth, relating them to the underlying
"official information" privilege, which, when included in proposed Rule 509 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, was rejected
by Congress in the wake of Watergate. 12 Finally, Part IV critiques the regulations as applied in federal criminal cases and
concludes that such application is inconsistent with the due
process and compulsory process clauses of the fifth and sixth
amendments, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
An examination of the housekeeping regulations is particularly timely in the context of the Burger Court's continuing
emphasis in its criminal procedure jurisprudence upon determining with finality the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused, rather than upon protecting his civil liberties from government intrusion, 13 and in light of the Reagan Administration's
general movement toward greater government secrecy as a
means of promoting more "efficient" government operations. 14
'2See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
3
See Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should Be Irrelevant: Government Overreaching As A Bar To Reprosecution Under The Double Jeopardy Clause After
Oregon v. Kennedy, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 76 (1983).
14See N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1983, at A13, col. 1 (presidential directive

requires executive branch employees to sign a secrecy pledge). See also N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1983, § 4, at 1, col. 3 (Reagan Justice Department supports

random lie detector tests for officials with access to confidential information).
With respect to proposed legislative changes authorizing greater govern-

ment secrecy, see S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), The Freedom of
Information Reform Act, introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch; and Senator
Hatch's comments in 129 Cong. Rec. S2688 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1983). See
also Hatch, The Freedom of Information Act: Balancing Freedom of Information With ConfidentialityForLaw Enforcement, 9 J. Contemp. L. 1 (1983).
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I. An Overview of the Federal Housekeeping Statute and
Justice Department Regulations
A. The Housekeeping Statute
The General Housekeeping Statute,15 originally enacted in
the late eighteenth century,16 authorizes the head of an executive
department to promulgate regulations respecting the govern-

ment of his department, the performance of its business, and
the custody of its records, provided the regulations are otherwise consistent with law. 17 Although Congress did not intend
the Housekeeping Statute to be a secrecy statute, 18 numerous
courts during the first half of the twentieth century cited it as
the principal or sole authority for executive departments to
withhold information from the courts. 19
In order to eliminate any doubt and to rectify erroneous
precedent, Congress amended the Housekeeping Statute in
1958, making explicit the fact that the section does not itself
15

U.S.C. § 301 (1982) provides:

§ 301. Departmental regulations
The head of an Executive department or military department
may prescribe regulations for the government of his department,
the conduct of his employees, the distribution and performance of
its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records,
papers, and property. This section does not authorize withholding
information from the public or limiting the availability of records
to the public.
16Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28; Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat.
49.

'7The Housekeeping Statute does not authorize a rule whose effect would
be to deprive one of his constitutional rights. Furthermore, the regulations
must not be in conflict with express statutory provisions. Parsons v. State,
251 Ala. 467, 38 So. 2d 209 (1948)(and cases cited).
1H.R. Rep. No. 1461, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3352.
19See, e.g., United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951);
Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900). See also Hardin, Executive Privilege
in the Federal Courts, 71 Yale L.J. 879, 882 (1962); Note, Discovery of
Government Documents and the Official Information Privilege, 76 Colum. L.
Rev. 142 (1976).
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create a privilege: "This section does not authorize withholding
information from the public or limiting the availability of records
to the public. 12 0 Since 1958, courts have recognized that the
statute does not confer a privilege upon the heads of executive
departments and that it cannot bar a demand for production of
nonprivileged evidence or judicial determination of questions of
privilege . 2 Although the amendment was designed to undercut
the statutory basis of a broad executive privilege, 22 it did not
end the struggle between litigants and the government over
access to government documents.2 3
Regulations promulgated under the Housekeeping Statute
have been the subject of only two Supreme Court cases. In both
Boske v. Comingore2 4 and United States ex rel. Touhy v.
Ragen2 5 the Court examined executive department regulations
2

Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547.
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)(5 U.S.C. § 301 does not create a privilege); EEOC v. Los Alamos
Constr. Co., 382 F. Supp. 1373 (D.N.M. 1974); Denny v. Carey, 78 F.R.D.
370 (E.D. Pa. 1978)(Congress ended any doubt as to whether 5 U.S.C. § 301
should affect the scope of discoverable records by the 1958 amendment).
22
Prior to the amendment, departments claimed a "general housekeeping"
privilege for documents within their control on the basis of 5 U.S.C. § 301.
Hardin, supra note 19, at 887.
21

2Id.

24177 U.S. 459 (1900). The government first attempted to withhold information from the judiciary on authority of the Housekeeping Statute in 1900.
In Boske, a collector for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) refused to comply
with a court order directing him to produce certain reports in the possession
of the IRS. The collector

based his refusal on a Treasury Department regulation promulgated
pursuant to the housekeeping statute, which barred all subordinate
employees from disclosing Internal Revenue Service records in
court proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Treasury Regulation insofar as it prohibited collectors from producing records of the Department without securing permission from
the Secretary.
Note, supra note 19, at 145. In dicta, the Court indicated that the Secretary's
privilege might be absolute. 177 U.S. at 470. Such an implied recognition of
absolute executive privilege probably has not survived United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974), even in the context of a civil proceeding.
2340 U.S. 462 (1951). See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
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in the context of a request for disclosure of documents. Neither
decision discussed the applicability to employee testimony of
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Housekeeping Statute.
The Justice Department (DOJ) Regulation in Touhy26 and the
section of the Treasury Regulation focused upon in Boske27 dealt
26

Order No. 3229 is reproduced and discussed infra at note 49.
"The Treasury Regulation examined in Boske is as follows:
Treasury Department, Office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Washington, D.C., April-15, 1898.
The following regulations are issued as supplementary to the instructions and suggestions contained on pages 41 and 42 of the
Regulations, series 7, No. 12, Revised. August 3rd, 1896:
All records in the offices of collectors of internal revenue or
of any of their deputies are in their custody and control for purposes
relating to the collection of the revenues of the United States only.
They have no control of them, and no discretion with regard to
permitting the use of them, for any other purpose. Collectors are
hereby prohibited from giving out any special tax records or any
copies thereof to private persons or to local officers, or to produce
such records or copies thereof in a state court, whether in answer
to subpoenas duces tecum or otherwise. Whenever such subpoenas
shall have been served upon them, they will appear in court in
answer thereto, and respectfully decline to produce the records
called for, on the ground of being prohibited therefrom by the
regulations of this department. The information contained in the
records relating to special tax payers in the collector's office is
furnished by these persons under compulsion of law for the purpose
of raising revenue for the United States; and there is no provision
of law authorizing the sending out of these records or of any copies
thereof, for use against the special tax payers in cases not arising
under the laws of the United States. The giving out of such records
or any copies thereof by a collector in such cases is held to be
contrary to public policy and not to be permitted. As to any other
records than those relating to special tax payers, collectors are also
forbidden to furnish them, or any copies thereof, at the request of
any person. Where copies thereof are desired for the use of parties
to a suit, whether in a state court, or in a court of the United States,
collectors should refer the persons interested to the following paragraph in rule X of the rules and regulations of the Treasury Department, namely: "In all cases where copies of documents or
records are desired by, or on behalf of, parties to a suit, whether
in a court of the United States, or any other, such copies shall be
furnished to the court only, and on a rule of the court upon the
Secretary of the Treasury requesting the same." Whenever such
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solely with document disclosure. The distinction is potentially
significant because documents are normally the property of the
party possessing them 28 and thus implicitly subject to some
control by their owner, even in the absence of a privilege.
Employee testimony, on the other hand (or the ideas such testimony would communicate), is not necessarily subject to the
control or ownership of the employer. 29 In other words, the
determination of an employer's right to control employee testimony is directly related to and should precede the ultimate
determination of the existence of a privilege.
Federal courts, however, have extrapolated from the Touhy
and Boske decisions a basis for upholding the validity of regulations which apply to all employee testimony concerning information acquired during their employment. 30 The Housekeeping
Statute itself expressly authorizes regulations for the custody
and use of departmental records, whereas it only impliedly establishes a basis for regulating employee testimony through the
rule of the court shall have been obtained collectors are directed
to carefully prepare a copy of the record or document containing
the information called for and send it to this office, whereupon it
will be transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury with a request
for its authentication, under the seal of the department, and transmission to the judge of the court calling for it, unless it should be
found that circumstances or conditions exist which make it necessary to decline, in the interest of the public service, to furnish
such a copy.
177 U.S. at 460-61.
28See generally 63 Am. Jur. 2d Property § 36 (1972); 73 C.J.S. Property
§ 25(c) (1983).
29
See generally 2 R. Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks & Monopolies §§ 14.30, 14.31 (4th ed. 1982)
3
See, e.g., Marcoux v. Mid-States Livestock, 66 F.R.D. 573 (W.D. Mo.
1975) (Boske and Touhy held that a subordinate will not be compelled to testify
and produce documents in private litigation when a department head forbids
disclosure); North Carolina v. Carr, 264 F. Supp. 75 (W.D.N.C. 1967)(Touhy
held that regulations prescribed by Attorney General with regard to production
of documents and failure of person charged to testify were valid). Criminal
cases relying on Touhy as a basis for finding the present DOJ Regulations
valid include United States v. Bizzard, 674 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 305 (1982); United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836
(1977).
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provision authorizing regulations governing the "conduct" of
employees. The absence of express language endorsing the regulation of testimony raises questions as to exactly what type of
regulation can be promulgated under a statute not intended to
3
create a privilege. '
"Iln Stegall v. Thurman, 175 F. 813 (N.D. Ga. 1910), the court examined
the Treasury Department's regulation of testimony pursuant to the predecessor
of 5 U.S.C. § 301. The question there was whether the government can

regulate an employee testifying as to what he discovers "by the use of his
senses, what he sees with his eyes." Id. at 819. The court concluded that
information obtained by a person solely in his official capacity cannot be
divulged by him when called as a witness in a state court. Id. at 822 (citing In
re Lamberton, 124 F. 446 (W.D. Ark. 1903)). The Treasury Regulation in
question expressly required the employees to decline to testify to facts coming
to their knowledge in their official capacity. According to the court, if Boske
held that a subordinate cannot be forced to disclose government documents
in a state court, he should not be compelled to do the same thing indirectly
by disclosing what he has discovered in the discharge of his duties as the
result of information contained in the documents. Id.
Therefore, the court found the Treasury Regulation governing testimony
promulgated after Boske valid not on the basis of language in the predecessor
of 5 U.S.C. § 301, but on the ground that failure to extend the reasoning of
Boske to employee testimony would undercut the holding of Boske. The court
did state that an employee may testify to matters he observes "otherwise than
officially." Id. at 823. Presumably, the court was suggesting that an employee
can testify to these matters because there is no potential government privilege
which will cover this testimony, not because the government has no proprietary interest in the information. Both the IRS Regulation in question and the
DOJ Regulation limit their coverage to information acquired in one's official
capacity.
The opinion in Stegall gives inadequate attention to delineating the proper
scope of official information, failing to sufficiently acknowledge that before
the question of executive privilege arises the court must determine whether
the information possessed by a government employee is the property of the
employer and thus subject to the employer's control. In other words, although
there may be no meaningful distinction between government documents and
employee testimony based upon those documents with respect to whether an
evidentiary privilege exists, there may very well be a question of whether the
government has any right to regulate certain employee testimony at all. For
example, no non-governmental employer could assert a property interest in
all information perceived by an employee during his job, even if the employee
received the information while performing official duties. See generally Callman, supra note 29, at §§ 14.30, 14.31. The question of what is or is not an
employer's proprietary information or trade secret is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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One court has held that the Housekeeping Statute cannot
be asserted as authorization for a regulation which reaches the
testimony of former employees. 32 The court noted that the
Housekeeping Statute on its face applies only to employees and
not to former employees. According to this court, even if the
Housekeeping Statute did apply to former employees, it is procedural in nature and creates no evidentiary privilege. 33 When
a court determines, therefore, that no privilege attaches to the
information a litigant seeks, the Housekeeping Statute should
34
not be used as a procedural basis for withholding information.
Accordingly, a litigant's failure to comply with certain procedures embodied in a regulation which lacks statutory authority
should not be used to withhold information from that litigant.
Lack of compliance with the Justice Department Regulations,
which purport to reach the testimony of current and former
employees, has 5nevertheless been used frequently as a basis for
3
nondisclosure.
B. The Justice Department Housekeeping Regulations
The current DOJ Regulations, 36 issued pursuant to the
Housekeeping Statute, prohibit officers and employees of the
department from divulging files, documents, records, and other
official information, except as permitted by the Attorney General. 37 The regulations set forth general procedures to be followed with respect both to production or disclosure of materials
in the department's files and to testimony of former or current
employees upon demand by other parties.
32Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
33Id. at 917.
341d.

infra note 79 and accompanying text.
3628 C.F.R. § 16.21-.29 (1983). The regulations supersede various department orders which have appeared in this century. The order most frequently
cited and at issue in the Touhy case was Order No. 3229, 11 Fed. Reg. 4920
(1939).
3See

37Timbers

& Cohen, Demands of Litigantsfor Government Information,

18 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 687, 690 (1957). This description is actually of Order No.
3229, which substantially differs from the current, much lengthier DOJ
Regulations.
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In proceedings in which the government is not a party, an
employee of the DOJ may not, in response to a demand for
documents, disclose such documents without approval of a designated DOJ official.38 The regulations also provide that the
responsible United States attorney request a summary of the
39
information sought and its relevance to the proceeding.
When a government employee receives a subpoena to appear in court, the regulations similarly require, whether or not
the government is a party, that the moving party submit a statement setting forth a summary of the testimony sought and its
40
relevance to the proceeding to the United States attorney. If
the Justice Department consents to the testimony, the scope of
3828 C.F.R. § 16.22(a) (1983) provides:
(a) In any federal or state case or matter in which the United
States is not a party, no employee or former employee of the
Department of Justice shall, in response to a demand, produce any
material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any
information relating to or based upon material contained in the files
of the Department, or disclose any information or produce any
material acquired as part of the performance of that person's official
duties or because of that person's official status without prior approval of the proper Department official in accordance with
§§ 16.24 and 16.25 of this part.
3928 C.F.R. § 16.22(d) (1983) provides: "When information other than oral
testimony is sought by a demand, the responsible United States attorney shall
request a summary of the information sought and its relevance to the proceeding." In proceedings to which the government is a party, the attorney
handling the case is authorized to reveal unclassified documents after seeking
approval from certain designated parties. 28 C.F.R. § 16.23(a) (1983).
4028 C.F.R. § 16.22(c) (1983) provides:
(c) If oral testimony is sought by a demand in any case or
matter in which the United States is not a party, an affidavit, or, if
that is not feasible, a statement by the party seeking the testimony
or by his attorney setting forth a summary of the testimony sought
and its relevance to the proceeding, must be furnished to the responsible United States attorney. Any authorization for testimony
by a present or former employee of the Department shall be limited
to the scope of the demand as summarized in such statement.
See also 28 C.F.R. § 16.23(c) (1983)(governing testimony in cases to which
government is party).
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the demand as summarized limits the testimony of the
41
employee.
In the event that the designated official considers the information to be confidential, the regulations set forth a procedure
for referring the decision to superiors in the DOJ. 42 The regulations enumerate factors to be considered in determining
whether disclosure should be made, such as whether disclosure
is appropriate under the rules of procedure governing the case
or under relevant substantive law concerning privilege. 43 They
also specify instances in which disclosure will not be made by
any DOJ official, including cases where disclosure would violate
a statute or reveal classified information. If disclosure would
reveal law enforcement investigatory records or the identity of
an informant, it will not be made unless the Attorney General
determines that the administration of justice requires
45
disclosure.
In the event that a court refuses to stay a proceeding until
a DOJ determination is made or the court itself determines that
a claim of privilege is not warranted, the regulations instruct
employees to decline to comply with the demand for information. 46 The validity of this rule, prohibiting document disclosure
4'28 C.F.R. § 16.22(c) (1983).
4228 C.F.R. § 16.24 (1983).
4328 C.F.R. § 16.26(a) (1983).
4428

C.F.R. § 16.26(b) (1983).

C.F.R. § 16.26(c) (1983).
-28 C.F.R. § 16.28 (1983) provides:
4528

If the court or other authority declines to stay the effect of the
demand in response to a request made in accordance with § 16.27
of this chapter pending receipt of instructions, or if the court or

other authority rules that the demand must be complied with irrespective of instructions rendered in accordance with §§ 16.24 and
16.25 of this part not to produce the material or disclose the information sought, the employee or former employee upon whom the

demand has been made shall, if so directed by the responsible
Department official, respectfully decline to comply with the demand. See United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462
(1951).
The regulations do not make any recommendations regarding the manner
in which the DOJ will proceed after the employee declines to respond in the
face of a court demand.
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by a subordinate in the face of a court order, was first addressed
by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen.47
Touhy, a state prisoner, brought a habeas corpus proceeding in
connection with which he subpoenaed an agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to appear and produce certain files. 48
The agent, when put on the stand, refused to produce the documents. 49 The district court ordered the witness to produce the
11340 U.S. 462 (1951). The Touhy Court examined the validity of Order
No. 3229, the predecessor of the current regulations.
4
The record indicates that the subpoena issued and served upon the FBI
agent also named the Attorney General. 340 U.S. at 465.
4
The agent acted in reliance upon DOJ Order No. 3229 (1946), the predecessor of 28 C.F.R. § 16.28 (1983). Order No. 3229 provided:
Pursuant to authority vested in me by R.S. 161, U.S. Code, Title
5, Section 22, It is hereby ordered:
All official files, documents, records and information in the
offices of the Department of Justice, including the several offices
of United States Attorneys, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
United States Marshalls, and Federal penal and correctional institutions, or in the custody or control of any officer or employee of
the Department of Justice, are to be regarded as confidential. No
officer or employee may permit the disclosure or use of the same
for any purpose other than for the performance of his official duties,
except in the discretion of the Attorney General, The Assistant to
the Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General acting for
him.
Whenever a subpoena duces tecum is served to produce any
such files, documents, records or information, the officer or employee on whom such subpoena is served, unless otherwise expressly directed by the Attorney General, will appear in court in
answer thereto and respectfully decline to produce the records
specified therein, on the ground that the disclosure of such records
is prohibited by this regulation.
Supplement No. 2 to that order, dated June 6, 1947, provides
in part:
TO ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED UPON RECEIVING A
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
Whenever an officer or employee of the Department is served
with a subpoena duces tecum to produce any official files, docu-
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subpoenaed material and held him in contempt for his refusal
to do so. 50 The Supreme Court, affirming the Seventh Circuit's
reversal of the lower court, held that a DOJ employee cannot
be held in contempt for refusal to produce requested material
when release of that material has not been authorized by the
5 1
appropriate official.
The Touhy Court limited its opinion to finding that a regulation which centralizes responsibility in a department for determining whether to claim a privilege for department-controlled
documents is consistent with the Housekeeping Statute. The
Court noted that its decision did not address the "ultimate reach

of the authority of the Attorney General to refuse to produce at

a Court's order the government papers in his hands .... -52
According to the Court, "the validity of the superior's action
ments, records or information he should at once inform his superior
officer of the requirement of the subpoena and ask for instructions
from the Attorney General. If, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, circumstances or conditions make it necessary to decline
in the interest of public policy to furnish the information, the officer
or employee on whom the subpoena is served will appear in court
in, answer thereto and courteously state to the court that he has
consulted the Department of Justice and is acting in accordance
with instructions of the Attorney General in refusing to produce
the records.

•..

It is not necessary to bring the required documents into

the court room and on the witness stand when it is the intention of
the officer or employee to comply with the subpoena by submitting
the regulation of the Department (Order No. 3229) and explaining
that he is not permitted to show the files. If questioned, the officer
or employee should state that the material is at hand and can be
submitted to the court for determination as to its materiality to the
case and whether in the best public interest the information should
be disclosed. The records should be kept in the United States
Attorney's office or some similar place of safe-keeping near the
court room. Under no circumstances should the name of any confidential informant be divulged.
340 U.S. at 463-64.
5
Id. at 465.
51
d. at 468.
52
d. at 467.

HeinOnline -- 19 Harv. C. R.-C. L. L. Rev. 363 1984

364

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 19

[was] in issue only insofar as we must determine whether the
Attorney General can validly withdraw from his subordinates
the power to release department papers. ' 53 Justice Frankfurter,
concurring, pointed out that the Court did not intend for its
decision to imply authority in the government to "shut off an
54
appropriate judicial demand" for papers.
The Touhy decision is narrowly focused. 55 Although the
decision upheld the validity of the DOJ Regulations before it, it
did so in a limited sense, since it dealt with a DOJ order which
only governed production of government documents, as opposed to employee testimony. 56 It is not certain that the Supreme
Court today would find that the Housekeeping Statute authorizes all aspects of the current DOJ Regulations. 57 Even if Congress did enact a statute which authorized a regulation similar
in coverage to the DOJ Regulations, the application of that
regulation in federal criminal cases would raise questions regarding its constitutional validity. When a regulation is determined to contravene constitutional rights or express statutory
provisions, of course, it no longer carries the weight of law.
Thus, in short, the DOJ Regulations approved by the Touhy
Court, more limited than the current regulations, (i) governed
access to documents which clearly were government property
but did not address access to employee testimony; (ii) provided
53/d.
-4Id. at 472 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter noted that
although there was no doubt that the Attorney General could be reached by
legal process, what disclosures he could be required to make were another
matter (i.e., a question of privilege). Id. at 473.
"See, e.g., United States v. Feeney, 501 F. Supp. 1337 (D. Colo. 1980).
56
The order upheld by the Court did not discuss regulation of employees'
non-documented testimony. It referred to a subpoena duces tecum rather than
a subpoena ad testificandum. Moreover, the Court pointedly noted, "inlor are
we here concerned with the effect of a refusal to produce in a prosecution by
the United States. . . ." (citation omitted). Id. at 467. The Court also noted,
as had the court of appeals, that the Attorney General's order placed the
burden of seeking approval for disclosure on the employee; the order also
specifically acknowledged that subpoenaed material "must be submitted 'to
the Court for determination as to its materiality to the case' even without
and prior to review by the Justice Department. That had not occurred in this
case only because the trial court had not required such in camera disclosure.
Id. at 466.
"See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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that submission of evidence by the subpoenaed government
employee to the Court for in camera review, even in the absence
of the Attorney General's approval, was appropriate, and, most
important, (iii) did not address the validity, under the due process and compulsory process clauses, of the state defendant's
conviction.5 8 Furthermore, as described below, 59 these regulations have been held not to have the force of law except insofar
as they apply to internal departmental issues. Nevertheless,
certain recent court decisions have relied on Touhy to uphold
the application of current DOJ Regulations in situations not
examined by the Touhy Court. 60 The next section discusses
recent case law in this area.
II. Spotlighting The Problem Through Conflicting Recent
Precedent and Policy
Two appellate decisions reported in 1981, both addressing
the conflict between a criminal defendant's need for evidence
within the government's possession and the government's need
for efficient decisionmaking procedures, have reached diametrically opposite results concerning the dispositive effect of the
federal housekeeping regulations.
In United States v. Marino,61 the defendants, charged with
several drug and related offenses, sought to discredit the government's main witnesses. Those witnesses, John and Cat
Peltin, claimed to have participated with the defendants in a
cocaine importation conspiracy but then took steps to withdraw
from the conspiracy. 62 In particular, the Peltins informed the
58

A regulation which is addressed and adapted to the enforcement of an

act of Congress normally has the force and effect of law if it is not in conflict
with express statutory provisions. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States,

251 U.S. 342 (1920). By finding the predecessor of the current regulations
consistent with law, the Touhy Court may have in some sense accorded them

the force and effect of law.
See also Comment, Executive Privilege and the Congress, Perspectives
and Recommendations, 23 De Paul L. Rev. 692, 709 (1974).
59
See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
6°See supra note 30; infra note 160.
61658 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1981).
62
Marino, one member of the conspiracy, gave $30,000 to Cat Peltin and

her sister, Williams, another convicted co-conspirator, to purchase cocaine in
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United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) about
the conspiracy, and received immunity from prosecution; they
also obtained a $5,000 cash bonus from the government and a
monthly stipend of $815 under the federal Witness Protection
63
Program in exchange for their trial testimony.
After the Peltins testified for the government and were
cross-examined by the defendants, the defendants sought to
subpoena federal personnel who had more direct knowledge of
the Peltins and of the circumstances surrounding their negotiations with the government. The defendants believed that the
Peltins' credibility and truthfulness, central to the case, could
be more directly impeached. The prosecution denied the defendants the witnesses' testimony for failure to comply with Justice
Department regulations requiring that the prosecutor be provided in advance with a summary of the intended questioning
of the federal employees. 64
In affirming the convictions of each of the defendants, the
Sixth Circuit did not actually recognize the relative importance
for the defense of securing the testimony of the federal employees. The court merely attributed formal and dispositive effect
to the procedural requirements of the Justice Department's
regulations:
The Department of Justice has a legitimate interest in
regulating access to government information contained
in its files or obtained by its employees during the scope
of their official duties. Without a procedure governing
demands by potential litigants, the efficiency of the
Department could be greatly impaired. The question of
Peru and return with the cocaine hidden in Cat's wheelchair. Cat Peltin
traveled to Peru, gave $30,000 to Castello, another co-conspirator, but then
returned without the cocaine. The purchase was not completed. Later, the
plan was changed so that cocaine was to be shipped to Peltin's home hidden
inside furniture. 658 F.2d at 1122.
Cat Peltin's husband, John, then contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration and revealed the plan to them. The exact chronology of John
Peltin's contacts with the government, as well as the details of his negotiations,
were63not disclosed. Id.
6

1d.

1Id. at 1125. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text, for a description and analysis of the regulations.
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whether these procedures deny the defendants their
Sixth Amendment right to call and cross-examine witnesses is not reached until the defendants follow the
procedures and then have their demands denied. Because Marino and Castello failed to make a demand in
accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 16.23(c), they have no
constitutional claim. 65
The court thus assumed that (i) the housekeeping regulations
had the force of law and were consistent with the underlying
legislation, and (ii) such procedural law pretermitted and supplanted fundamental sixth and fifth amendment protections.
Such an approach recently has become the rule in federal crim66
inal cases.
A state appellate court, on the other hand, has taken a
different approach to the applicability of the same federal regulations in a criminal case. In Buford v. State,67 the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that a defendant's failure to comply with
DOJ Regulations 68 for requesting disclosure of documents for
65

1d. The Court's suggestion that the regulations support the "efficiency"
of the department is discussed infra at notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
Governmental efficiency, in fact, would be aided if the government, not the
defendant, were required preliminarily to seek the trial court's in camera
review of the materiality of the subpoenaed information, as the Justice Department order upheld in Touhy suggested. See supra note 49 for the text of
that order.
6See infra notes 79, 160. For example, in United States v. Bizzard, 674
F.2d 1382 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 305 (1982), the defendant had
subpoenaed, pursuant to court order, the former prosecutor, who had resigned
from government service, as a hostile defense witness. When the government's
key witness, an alleged accomplice, again refused to implicate the defendant
at trial, the government was allowed to read his prior statement to the jury.
The defendant had sought the former prosecutor's testimony to prove that the
accomplice had intended to recant his accusation, received threats from the
prosecutor and an F.B.I. agent, and then decided to say nothing. Because the
defendant, although generally describing the subject of the intended testimony,
refused to disclose in advance to the government the specific nature of his
intended questioning of the former prosecutor, the trial court quashed the
defense subpoena. The author of this Article argued this case for Bizzard
before the Eleventh Circuit.
67158 Ga. App. 763, 282 S.E.2d 134 (1981).
s28 C.F.R. § 16.21-.29 (1982); see supra notes 36-46 and accompanying
text.
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trial did not bar the trial court from ordering production of the
documents. Since the trial court had failed to compel production
the court of appeals vacated the defenof the defense evidence,
69
dant's conviction.
Indicted for possession of controlled substances, the defendant in Buford claimed that he was an informant for the United
States Drug Enforcement Administration. In an attempt to substantiate his defense, the defendant issued a subpoena duces
tecum to a DEA agent requesting him to appear and bring
70
documents concerning defendant's connection with the DEA.
The State of Georgia successfully moved to quash the subpoena
on grounds that compliance with the subpoena was inconsistent
regulations and sought confidential
with DOJ housekeeping
7
information. '
69158 Ga. App. at 764-68, 282 S.E.2d at 135-38.
70
1 d. Buford requested the following information:
[T]he DEA telephone toll receipts for the period in question; all
information pertaining to Buford's contact with the DEA, all information pertaining to a certain arrest in Alabama (towards which
Buford contends he provided information); and all manuals or documents pertaining to policies and procedures of the DEA with
regard to termination of confidential informants.
Id. at 764-65, 282 S.E.2d at 136. It is unclear from the record whether Buford
desired to elicit testimony from the DEA agent once he appeared in court.
The court did not examine directly the DOJ's regulation of testimony.
7
Id. at 765, 282 S.E.2d at 136. The DOJ never considered the request
and thus never asserted a privilege. Only the DOJ could assert a privilege for
the information within its custody. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
Whether confidential or not, the information sought by the subpoena was
highly relevant. Buford's defense at trial was that, as an operative and informant for the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, his work with
that department necessitated his active involvement in drug-related activities,
with the DEA's knowledge and permission. Witnesses for the DEA admitted
that Buford had been an operative for six months, but stated that his services
had been terminated in September 1976, and that the DEA had had no contact
with him since that time. Buford testified that he had received no notice of
any such termination. He produced a witness who testified that she had heard
Buford make telephone calls to DEA agents after September 1976, the date
of the alleged termination, as well as a telephone bill which showed a call
made to the DEA number in Atlanta from Buford's mother's residence, where
Buford also lived, in February 1977.
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The Georgia Court of Appeals held that, although valid as
a mechanism for removing discretion from subordinates regarding disclosure of documents,7 2 the regulations could not be used
to withhold or limit the availability of information to litigants,
particularly in criminal trials. 73 Drawing from United States v.
Nixon, 74 the court noted that it had a duty to guarantee the
75

defendant's right to confrontation and compulsory process
even in the face of an attempt to suppress information through
a claim of executive privilege. 76 To withhold relevant and maof privilege "would impair the
terial information on the basis
77
basic function of the courts.
The court concluded that the trial court, upon a determination that the information requested is material, should ask the
Attorney General to disclose such information. 78 Furthermore,
upon an assertion of privilege by the Attorney General, the trial
court should evaluate the claim and order disclosure of all materials necessary for due process. If the trial court were to
uphold a motion to quash a subpoena because of defendant's
failure to comply with the DOJ Regulations, it would be abandoning its duty to the criminal justice system by permitting the
trial to continue without information which could be critical to
the defendant's case. The Buford court thus indicated that a
court's duty to marshall evidence and guarantee the defendant's
constitutional rights of confrontation and compulsory process
overrides the state's interest in asserting a technical violation
of internal regulations by the defendant as a basis for foreclosing
the defendant's access to necessary information.
The Buford opinion, in refusing to uphold a witness exclusion sanction, represents an important departure from the approach of federal case law, such as Marino, regarding the effect
of a defendant's noncompliance with the DOJ Regulations. In
72

See United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
71158 Ga. App. at 766, 282 S.E.2d at 137. The DOJ Regulations are
promulgated under the Federal Housekeeping Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1982),

which does not authorize the withholding of information. See supra note 15.
74418 U.S. 683 (1974).

15158 Ga. App. at 767, 282 S.E.2d at 137. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
76
See infra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
77158 Ga. App. at 767, 282 S.E.2d at 137 (citing United States v. Nixon,
683, 712 (1974)).
418 U.S.
78
1d. at 768, 282 S.E.2d at 137.
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federal criminal cases in which defendants have been denied
access to documents or testimony because of failure to comply with DOJ Regulations, federal appeals courts, such as in
Marino, consistently have refused to examine sixth amendment
claims, holding that such constitutional claims are reviewable
only when a defendant follows the requisite procedures and is
79
denied disclosure.
The federal courts have failed to recognize that the effect
of their decisions is to permit the regulations to constitute a real
barrier against disclosure. While the Justice Department may
have a legitimate interest in some cases in regulating access to
"official" information by requiring the approval of the Attorney
General, the DOJ Regulations do not create a privilege preventing disclosure of that information in a judicial proceeding. 80
By effectively barring disclosure at the trial level and review
at the appeals level, the regulations in fact conflict with the
express language of their authorizing statute.8 The Housekeeping Statute 82 permits departments to promulgate regulations regarding the custody of papers and records, but not regulations
which bar or limit access to department documents in a manner
which interferes with the integrity of a criminal trial. The Housekeeping Statute only authorizes regulations consistent with law.
In fact, regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute which
relate to the internal operations of an agency have been held
not to have the force of law even with respect to the rights of
83
third parties.
Although valid to control internally the release of government property, the DOJ Housekeeping Regulations as applied
in federal criminal cases undermine a defendant's sixth amendment rights to the same extent as does the alibi witness exclusion
79
See United States v. Fricke, 684 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1250 (1983); United States v. Bizzard, 674 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 305 (1982); United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120
(6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Estrella, 567 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1977); United
States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977).
8
See supra note 20.

815 U.S.C. § 301.
82
See
83

supra note 15 for the text of the statute.
The statement of procedural rules governing employee conduct promulgated, for example, by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 301 does "not have the force and effect of law." Einhorn v. DeWitt, 618
F.2d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1980)(citations omitted).
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sanction at issue in Taliaferro. The Buford court, cognizant of
these problems, recognized that the judiciary is not precluded
by regulation from calling upon the Attorney General, if necessary, to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial at which the
selected jury has the opportunity to weigh all relevant evidence.8 4 It refused to defer to the government's claim for efficiency, which effectively would elevate any piece of information
which might be the subject of an executive branch employee's
testimony to the status of privilege adhering to the government.
The next section of this Article discusses the basis for such a
claim of privilege.
III. Government Privilege and the Government's Right to
Restrict the Disclosure of Information
The overview of the DOJ Regulations and the Housekeeping Statute contained in the first part of this Article85 reveals
that neither confers upon the Justice Department a privilege to
withhold information. The regulations are procedural in nature
and may not vest any substantive authority concerning executive relationships with other institutions. 86 Technically, therefore, the question of privilege arises only after a department
head determines that disclosure is not appropriate, whether in
response to the request of a party who has followed the procedures set forth in the regulations, or pursuant to a demand by
a trial judge. Furthermore, when testimony rather than documents is sought, the question of privilege should not arise unless
it has been determined that the government employer has some
property interest in the employee's testimony.
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence8 7 defines the
extent of privilege in the federal courts, but it does not address
84After the court of appeals rendered its decision, the DEA provided the
information to the defendant. Buford v. State, 162 Ga. App. 498, 291 S.E.2d
256 (1982).
85
See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
86

See supra note 83.

87Rule 501 provides as follows:

GENERAL RULE
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of
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the scope of official information or trade secrets which might
be known to an employee yet also be the property of the employer. Enacted in 1975,88 Rule 501 codified the existing common
law of privileges and provided that privileges should continue
to develop under a uniform standard applicable in both criminal
and civil cases. The Rule provides, however, that federally
evolved rules of privilege should apply in federal criminal
cases.8 9 When the Attorney General contends that the information requested by a defendant is confidential, therefore, Rule
501 theoretically allows him to assert any of the privileges recognized by the federal courts as reserved for the government;9 0
Rule 501, however, does not specifically address the impact
upon a federal prosecution of a successful assertion of government privilege in response to a defense subpoena.
a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
88

Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence as approved by the Supreme
Court set forth nine nonconstitutional privileges. When the Rules were submitted to the Congress the matter of privileges raised considerable controversy, and Congress substituted for the specific rules of Article V the present
single Rule 501. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 501[01]
(1982). One of the most controversial of the specific privileges approved by
the Supreme Court was the government privilege for state secrets and official
information set forth in proposed Rule 509. Id. at 501-17. For a discussion
of Rule 509, see infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
89
1n diversity of citizenship cases, federal courts are required by the
specific language of Rule 501 to apply state law of privilege.
"Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Whether or not information in the custody of executive departments
should be disclosed in judicial proceedings depends upon a balancing of the
need for disclosure against other policies, such as the policy of protecting
military secrets. Evidentiary privileges established at common law protected
military and state secrets and the identity of government informers. 8 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2378, at 794 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Congress also
has enacted statutes protecting various government communications and reports. Id. at § 2374. For further discussion of asserted bases for privilege, see
Hardin, supra note 19, at 881-83.
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The privileges available to the government as recognized
by the courts fall into broad categories. The first, and most
relevant to this Article, encompasses the claim of executive
privilege, which is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 91 The Supreme Court has recognized an executive privilege against disclosure of documents containing military or diplomatic secrets 92 and documents containing
91

Agencies have claimed that by virtue of the separation of powers doctrine, they have an inherent right to withhold information under an "executive
privilege." Carrow, Governmental Non-disclosure in Judicial Proceedings,
107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166, 170 (1958).
President Nixon asserted this argument in support of his claim of absolute
privilege in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The President argued
that "the independence of the Executive Branch within its own sphere...
insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential communications." Id. at
706. The Court held that the doctrine of separation of powers could not sustain
an absolute, unqualified privilege of immunity from judicial process and that
the interest in preserving the confidentiality of the information could be protected by conducting an in camera examination. Id.
For an argument disavowing the basis of an executive privilege in the
separation of powers doctrine, see R. Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth (1974).
92United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). In Reynolds, three
civilian observers were killed when an Air Force bomber crashed while testing
secret equipment. Their widows filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Before trial, the plaintiffs moved under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for production of the Air Force's official investigation report and
for those statements of the three surviving crew members that were taken in
connection with the investigation. The Government claimed privilege pursuant
to Air Force regulations promulgated under the Housekeeping Statute and
based upon state secret considerations. Id. at 3-4. Both the district court and
court of appeals rejected the government's claim and ordered in camera
disclosure. Reversing, the Supreme Court said that "Oj]udicial control over the
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officials."
Id. at 9-10. The Court, however, went on to say that in a civil case an in
camera examination would not be necessary if the government could demonstrate to the court that there is a reasonable danger that disclosure will
expose military secrets. Id. at 10. The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence on the record to establish that state secrets might be revealed
and thus declined to order an in camera examination. The Court's decision
may represent a compromise designed to avoid clashes between the judiciary
and the executive.
Because the Court limited its analysis to civil proceedings and to the state
secret privilege and did not address the official information privilege, it is
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deliberations of high executive officials. 93 The lower courts have
also recognized an executive privilege for intergovernmental
documents reflecting policy determinations. 94 Courts have occasionally recognized three other forms of privilege claimed by
the various executive agencies: 95 a law enforcement evidentiary
privilege; 96 an informer privilege; 97 and, finally, an official information privilege, 98 the theory underlying non-disclosure in Buford and Marino. A governmental or executive privilege belongs
to the government and can be asserted or waived only by it.99
unclear why lower courts have broadly cited Reynolds as controlling with
regard to the Housekeeping Statute. See Note, supra note 19.
"United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-07 (1974).
94
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.
1966), affd mem. sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d
336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
"Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339, 343 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
96Black v. Sheraton Corp., 564 F.2d 531, 541-47 (D.C. Cir. 1977). This
privilege is based upon the harm to law enforcement efforts which might arise
from public disclosure of government investigatory files. (The Black case is
sometimes cited as Black v. United States; see, e.g., Women in Science, 566
F.2d at 343).
9'Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). This privilege protects
from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information to law enforcement officials. The informer's privilege protects the government's interest
in the flow of information concerning possible violations of the law.
"Black, 564 F.2d at 541-47. This privilege is designed to protect information which citizens give to the government. Analogous to the informer's
privilege, this privilege is based on the government's interest in protecting the
flow of information concerning the subject of a particular report. See Note,
supra note 19.
For an in-depth review of the official information privilege, see Annot.,
95 L. Ed. 425 (1951). "It seems also to be settled that, excepting the common
law privileges mentioned above, a governmental privilege against disclosure
of routine information cannot be exercised in judicial proceedings to which
the government ...

is a party." Id. at 426.

"United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7. See Timbers & Cohen, Denands of Litigantsfor Government Information, 18 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 687, 706
(1957).
The debate over the scope of executive privilege has arisen both in cases
in which the government is a party and in cases in which the government is
not a party. Where the government is a party, the official information privilege
cannot be asserted successfully. Annot., supra note 98, at 425, 426. It follows
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In the judicial context, privileges differ from other rules of
evidence in their purpose.100 Privileges represent "an adjustment
between important but competing interests";10' they are designed to promote extrajudicial relationships and interests by
permitting witnesses to keep reliable evidence secret. 102 In most
cases, the interests protected by privileges are deemed to be
"more important than the unfettered determination of truth in
judicial proceedings."'' 0 3 The government's assertion of privilege, however, is subject to limitations which do not similarly
restrict an individual's claim of privilege. When the government
is involved in a judicial proceeding, it may have an interest in
withholding information, but it is also subject to the constitutional requirement that the proceeding meet due process standards.10 4 Therefore, the scope of the government's privilege in
that procedures embodied in the housekeeping regulations for predisclosure
by an adverse party to the government serve no purpose at all except to
prejudice the defendant, unless the subpoenaed government employee might
be asked to reveal information rising to the level of "secrets of state."
The government as prosecutor is not necessarily the party who claims
the executive privilege. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the
privilege was not asserted by the government prosecutor but by the President,
a third party to the suit. Consequently, in that case the privilege did not force
a choice between prosecution and disclosure. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 163 n.445 (1974) (author uses term "government privilege" to apply only when it is asserted by prosecution).
'0°Westen, supra note 99, at 160.
'O1Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324
(D.D.C. 1966).
102See Westen, supra note 99, at 161. Rules of competence, unlike privileges, are designed to promote the integrity of the factfinding process by
excluding potentially unreliable or misleading evidence. Id.
03
d. at 161. In explaining the role of privileges, Professor McCormick
said:
They do not in any wise aid the ascertainment of truth, but rather
they shut out the light. Their sole warrant is the protection of
interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded
as of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice
of sources of facts needed in the administration of justice.
C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 152 (2d. ed. 1972).
104Carrow, supra note 91 at 168. The government has the duty to see that
justice is done. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254
F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

HeinOnline -- 19 Harv. C. R.-C. L. L. Rev. 375 1984

376

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 19

a criminal case is limited by the requirements of fundamental
06
fairness °5 and the individual's right to prepare his defense.
The Supreme Court has declared that the precise boundaries of executive privilege will be determined by the judiciary,
not the executive. 0 7 When the government asserts a privilege,
the court should balance the interests at stake to determine
whether disclosure would be more injurious to the government's
need for secrecy than nondisclosure would be to the private
litigant's defense. 0 8 In criminal cases, when the conflict between
interests is irreconcilable, the courts have held that the government must choose between its interest in prosecuting the defendant and in preserving the privilege. 0 9 In explaining the rationale
of this rule, the Supreme Court stated that "it is unconscionable
to allow [the government] to undertake prosecution and then
invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of
anything which might be material to his defense.""10
In United States v. Nixon"' the Supreme Court clearly
articulated the limitations to be imposed upon executive privi'0'Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61 (if necessary to defense, identity of informer
must be revealed or prosecution dropped).
1061d. at 60.
0
0'United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1 (1953). "[I]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is" with respect to the claim of privilege
presented in this case. 418 U.S. at 703 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
"SUnited States v. Article of Drug Consisting of 30 Individually Cartoned
Jars, 43 F.R.D. 181, 190 (D. Del. 1967).
109Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); United States v.
Beckman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d
503 (2d Cir. 1944). If the government prefers to assert its privilege it must
proceed without the testimony of witnesses impeachable by the privileged
evidence. If the government withholds evidence forming part of an element
of the prosecution's or defendant's case, it must waive prosecution. A court
may also dismiss a civil suit when the government is the plaintiff. Hardin,
supra note 19, at 890.
"0Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12. The government interests in secrecy can be
protected by an in camera examination of the privileged information.
11418 U.S. 683 (1974). Although this Article focuses upon privileges
claimed by the government as prosecutor, the Nixon decision provides direction on the matter of privilege. In Nixon, the President, a third party to the
suit with no control over the case, asserted a claim of privilege.
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lege in a criminal proceeding. Even though former President
Nixon, who was asserting the privilege in this case, was only a
third party to the suit, the Court refused to recognize an absolute
privilege. 112 Although the Court recognized a presumption in
favor of the privileged nature of presidential communications,
it stated that this presumption must be examined critically in
light of the constitutional protections guaranteed to the defendant in the criminal adversary system.1 13 Noting that the President rested his claim of privilege upon a generalized interest in
confidentiality, 14 the Court concluded that such a general claim
must yield to "the fundamental demands of due process of law
in the fair administration of criminal justice."1' 15 To allow a
"privilege to withhold evidence demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process and
gravely impair the basic function of the courts" to guarantee
compulsory process. 116

A claim of privilege by either the President or an executive
agency thus should not interfere with the judiciary's role in
reviewing that claim and presiding over a trial, even when the
material sought to be disclosed is clearly the property of the
government. Furthermore, when employee testimony is sought
which would not reveal any obvious government secrets in a
2
i at 707.
1d.
131d. at 711. According to the Court:

The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him" and "to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the manifest
duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish
that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be
produced.
Id.

"4The Court indicated that its balancing process would have yielded
different results had the President claimed privilege to protect specific military,
diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. 418 U.S. at 706.
"56Id. at 713.

11d, at 712.
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civil or criminal proceeding, "judicial control over the evidence
. . . cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officials. 1' 17
Yet that is exactly what happened in Marino, when, in effect,
the government was allowed to assert a privilege not to disclose
information except upon the terms of its own unilaterally developed regulations." 8 The following section analyzes how federal courts should evaluate such claims of privilege in criminal
proceedings such as Marino.
IV. The Impact of the DOJ Regulations Upon The Fairness of
a Criminal Trial
The General Housekeeping Statute is drafted in general
terms, without specific reference to federal criminal proceedings, and thus does not purport to authorize a rule whose application would deprive a person of his constitutional or statutory rights." 9 Regulations promulgated under the statute should
be similarly flexible. An examination of the protections accorded
a federal defendant in a criminal trial by the fifth and sixth
amendments and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reveals, however, that the DOJ Housekeeping Regulations conflict
with these protections.
As noted above, 120 federal appeals courts assert that the
validity of the DOJ Regulations was established in United States
ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen 2 ' and therefore allow the government
to deny access to information sought by defendants. In so deferring to the executive branch, these courts have overlooked
the dilemma created by the regulations for the defendant seeking
information and the narrow context in which the Touhy Court
upheld the validity of the regulations. By requiring the defendant
to submit a summary of the documents or testimony desired in
order to trigger consideration of the request, the DOJ Regulations facially conflict with the defendant's due process right to
reciprocal discovery and interfere with his sixth amendment
right to prepare a defense. Because compliance with the regu7

1d.

"'See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.

"'See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
'See supra notes 30 and 79.

121340 U.S. 462 (1951).
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lations does not guarantee timely disclosure, or for that matter,
any disclosure, the defendant is left in the position of deciding
between exercising his constitutional rights and prematurely
revealing his defense. By choosing to assert his constitutional
rights he risks giving the government an advantage by disclosing
part of his own case, including defense theories otherwise protected by the work-product doctrine and not discoverable by
the government under the Federal Rules of Criminal
22
Procedure.1
A. Due Process Concerns
Although a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to pretrial discovery, he does have a right to obtain
and present relevant evidence at trial. 123 Moreover, in Wardius
v. Oregon, 24 the Supreme Court held that a statute requiring
the defendant to give pretrial notice of any alibi to the prosecution must provide the defendant with reciprocal discovery
rights. The defendant in Wardius failed to follow such a state
statute. 125 As a consequence of his noncompliance, the defendant, as in Taliaferro, was not permitted to introduce his alibi
evidence at trial. 126 The Court held that the sanctions of the
statute violated due process in the absence of reciprocal discovery.127 It stated that in the absence of a strong showing of state
interest to the contrary, discovery must be a "two-way
street."'128 In examining the burden placed upon the defendant
22

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b).
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); Clinton, The Right To Present A
Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guaranteein CriminalTrials, 9 Ind. L.
Rev. 711, 848 (1976).
1

23

1

124412 U.S. 470 (1973).

'2The Oregon statute at issue was Ore. Rev. Stat. § 135.455 (1983)
(formerly § 135.875)). The statute required that the defendant, because he
proposed to rely on an alibi defense, advise the prosecuting attorney in advance of trial of the places where he claimed to have been at the time of the
crime and the names and addresses of all alibi witnesses. Id.
126412 U.S. at 471; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 135.455(1) (formerly § 135.875(1)).
127412 U.S. at 472. The Court did not address the constitutional questions
that might be raised by sanctions imposed upon the defendant by an otherwise
valid notice-of-alibi rule. Id. at 472 n.4.
'2BId. at 475.
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by the statute, the Court explained: "It is fundamentally unfair
to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case
while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise
concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he
disclosed to the State."'' 29 Although the state argued that the
trial court might have exercised its discretion to construe the
rule to require notice of the government's rebuttal witnesses,
the Supreme Court found that the absence of mandatory reciprocal discovery rendered the statute facially invalid.130
The DOJ Procedural Regulations were not intended as a
discovery scheme but rather were designed to efficiently expedite and centralize decisionmaking regarding the disclosure of
government information; nevertheless, a premise of the regulations is that any information to which a government employee
might testify is subject to governmental control. Moreover, pretrial disclosure of defense theories in order to obtain that information is obviously required by the regulations and such disclosure can be used by the prosecutor to his advantage at trial.
The procedures for obtaining approval of a defense trial subpoena under the regulations closely resemble the procedures of
the notice-of-alibi rule at issue in Taliaferro.131 The defendant
must identify those government witnesses he wishes to use at
trial and submit a summary of the matters to which he expects
the witnesses to testify in order for such testimony not to be
129 d. at 476.
I"Id. at 478-79. According to the Court, this argument was unavailing
because of the lack of predictability about what the state court would have
required. When the defendant was required to decide whether or not to reveal
his alibi, he was faced with a statute which made no provision for reciprocal
rights of discovery. Once the defendant submitted the alibi information, he
could not retract it; even if the statute was invalidated later, the state would
still have had the advantage. Id.
The Wardius Court did not clearly define the scope of the discovery a
state must afford a criminal defendant under its rule. For a discussion of the
state's reciprocal duty, see Nakell, The Effect of Due Process on Criminal
Defense Discovery, 62 Ky. L.J. 58 (1973). Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1(b) requires
the government to provide the identity of witnesses it will use to "establish
defendant's presence at the scene of the alleged offense."
"'The discussion from this point forward will proceed on the assumption
that, in effect, the DOJ Regulations function like notice-of-alibi rules and thus
should be subject to the same constitutional limitations.
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excluded. 132 In the absence of any provision guaranteeing disclosure by the government to the defendant of its witness list
or prosecution theory prior to trial, these procedures clearly do
not provide a "two-way" flow of information. The defendant is
required to reveal his expected evidence for which he should
constitutionally receive disclosure of information in return. Under Wardius, the lack of reciprocal pretrial discovery and the
absence of even the assurance that the defendant will be permitted to call the witness violate fundamental fairness and due
33
process.1
Wardius did contain an exception to the "two-way" requirement: a "compelling state interest" might justify not guaranteeing "a two-way street.' 1 34 Even assuming that the DOJ's interest
in efficiency and confidentiality were sufficient to warrant an
exception to the Wardius rule, the procedures contained in the
regulations are unduly prejudicial. In order to secure testimony,
the defendant risks, directly or indirectly, disclosing to his adversary prior to trial "his preliminary or speculative information,
132See supranotes 38-46 and accompanying text. Since this Article focuses
upon federal criminal cases, it will not fully address the comparable requirements of advance notice with regard to documents in cases to which the
United States government is not a party. Very similar problems are encountered 33whether or not the federal government is a party.
1 The argument set forth in the text is drawn from an analysis of the
possible constitutional problems presented by the notice of insanity defense.
Although a defendant must give notice of his intent to rely upon an insanity
defense, no duty of reciprocal discovery is imposed upon the government.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2. No court has addressed the due process problems
involved in requiring the defendant to give a notice of insanity defense, but
one might argue that, under Wardius, courts should require the government
to reveal the identity of witnesses the government will use to rebut the defense.
According to one writer, the basis for such an extension of Wardius lies in
trying to counterbalance the advantages the government possesses in its investigative techniques. Comment, Amendments to the FederalRules of Criminal Procedure--Expansionof Discovery, 66 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 23, 31
(1975).
The rule at issue in Wardius is more directly analogous to the DOJ
Regulations than to the notice of insanity rule. The Wardius case and the DOJ
Regulations involve forced disclosure of names of defense witnesses, not just
notice. Therefore, the DOJ is arguably within the scope of the Wardius rule.
134Wardius, 412 U.S. at 475. "But we do hold that in the absence of a
strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a twoway street." Id.
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his interpretations or evaluations of evidence that he has, [and]
his planning of trial strategy .
,,35
"... Furthermore, it is unreasonable to require the defendant to predict what he expects the
witness will say before the witness has even testified and then
limit him in the scope of his examination by this prediction. 136
Such a limitation would be particularly prejudicial in cases like
Marino, where the defendant hoped to use government employees to impeach the trial testimony of the key government witness
but could not know in advance of trial what that testimony
would include.
The regulations also impose unnecessary burdens on the
defendant without promoting the legitimate ends of justice. 137
Even if the Justice Department has a legitimate interest in preventing disclosure of confidential information, this interest and
the interests of the defendant can be protected through less
intrusive procedures than those now employed. A reasonable
approach to this problem is one similar to that set forth in Fed.
R. Crim. P. 17(b). 138 Rule 17(b) provides that a court will issue
a subpoena for a named witness upon an ex parte application
of a defendant, summarizing his intended use of the witness,
when the defendant is financially unable to pay the witness's
fees. 3 9 Although the court has the discretion to deny the request
5
13Nakell,

CrininalDiscovery for the Defense and the Prosecution--The
Developing Constitutional Considerations,50 N.C.L. Rev. 437, 476 (1972).

The author discusses the disadvantages to the defendant if he is required to
establish a foundation for receiving documents through discovery.
1161d. at 475.
1371d.
13'Rule 17(b) provides as follows:

Defendants Unable to Pay. The court shall order at any time that
a subpoena be issued for service on a named witness upon an ex
parte application of a defendant upon a satisfactory showing that
the defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of the witness
and that the presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate
defense. If the court orders the subpoena to be issued the costs
incurred by the process and the fees of the witness so subpoenaed
shall be paid in the same manner in which similar costs and fees
are paid in case of a witness subpoenaed in behalf of the
government.
'An ex parte approach would also be appropriate for a request for
documents.
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based upon the defendant's failure to demonstrate the relevance
of the witness's intended testimony, this procedure theoretically
permits the defendant to keep confidential the names and expected testimony of the witnesses he wishes to subpoena.
Two factors support the use of an ex parte approach in
requesting testimony of government witnesses. First, unlike the
notice-of-alibi rules, the summary of testimony is not required
and is not intended to aid the prosecutor in the preparation of
his case.140 Second, the trial judge constitutionally regulates the
trial process and should be expected to evaluate the defendant's
need for subpoenaed evidence before the Justice Department
bureaucracy is required, in effect, to dismiss a prosecution in
order to protect a secret. If the court decides that the request
is for material and relevant information, then a claim of privilege
by the government would not be likely to prevail at the defendant's expense. In such a case, the government will either have
to allow the testimony or drop the prosecution.141 If the government recognized that it was faced with such a choice, its decision whether to allow the testimony would be "informed." As
the DOJ Regulations are now applied, Justice Department officials presumably must decide whether to disclose government
information whenever a party seeks any information, including
irrelevant evidence, before the trial court ever learns of the
request. Such a result is hardly efficient, and may lead to vacillation or changes in policy depending upon subsequent judicial
review.
In other words, courts in effect should exercise their authority to influence executive branch decisionmaking regarding
trial evidence. If the government allows disclosure after being
ordered to do so by the court, then the defendant is in a sense
receiving reciprocal discovery rights under Wardius. If the prosecution is dropped, then presumably no one is at a disadvantage
140Westen, Compulsory Process 11, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 270 (1975).

Once the court determines that the information sought is relevant, it can
require the government to produce the information for an in camera inspection. The government therefore does not risk any greater disclosure by having
the court evaluate the defendant's claim ex parte and its claim of privilege in
camera than it would if the defendant had followed the procedures, been
denied disclosure, and the court had requested an in camera examination to
the interests of the two parties.
balance
141See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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vis-a-vis the protection of interests in secrecy or disclosure. If,
on the other hand, the court determines that the request is not
for material testimony, the court may deny the request without
having unnecessarily exposed elements of the defendant's case
to the prosecution. Therefore, requiring the defendant to submit
to the prosecutor a summary of expected testimony or a list of
documents in advance of trial is not only contrary to the notions
of fairness espoused by the Wardius Court, 142 but also inefficient
in some cases and unnecessary to protect the interests of the
government.

The procedure proposed here is similar in purpose to the
procedure set forth by proposed Rule 509 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 43 The drafters of Rule 509, which was deleted by
142See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
143Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509, 56 F.R.D. 183, 251 (1972), provided as

follows:
SECRETS OF STATE AND OTHER OFFICIAL
INFORMATION
(a) Definitions.
(1) Secret of state. A "secret of state" is a governmental secret
relating to the national defense or the international relations of the
United States.
(2) Official information. "Official information" is information
within the custody or control of a department or agency of the
government the disclosure of which is shown to be contrary to the
public interest and which consists of: (A) intragovernmental opinions or recommendations submitted for consideration in the performance of decisional or policymaking functions, or (B) subject to
the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3500, investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes and not otherwise available, or
(C) information within the custody or control of a governmental
department or agency whether initiated within the department or
agency or acquired by it in its exercise of its official responsibilities
and not otherwise available to the public pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

§ 552.
(b) General rule of privilege. The government has a privilege
to refuse to give evidence and to prevent any person from giving
evidence upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of danger that
the evidence will disclose a secret of state or official information,
as defined in this rule.
(c) Procedures. The privilege of secrets of state may be
claimed only by the chief officer of the government agency or
department administering the subject matter which the secret in-
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Congress in its enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,144
sought to establish government privileges for secrets of state
and official information., Under Rule 509, if the privilege claimed
was for secrets of state, the government had to show that there
was a reasonable likelihood that the requested evidence would
disclose such a secret.1 45 It was not clear whether the evidence
requested had to be produced for the court's inspection.146 Upon
the government's motion the necessary showing could be made
in camera.147 If the privilege claimed was for official information,
formation sought concerns, but the privilege for official information
may be asserted by any attorney representing the government. The
required showing may be made in whole or in part in the form of
a written statement. The judge may hear the matter in chambers,
but all counsel are entitled to inspect the claim and showing and to
be heard thereon, except that, in the case of secrets of state, the
judge upon motion of the government, may permit the government
to make the required showing in the above form in camera. If the
judge sustains the privilege upon a showing in camera, the entire
text of the government's statements shall be sealed and preserved
in the court's records in the event of appeal. In the case of privilege
claimed for official information the court may require examination
in camera of the information itself. The judge may take any protective measure which the interests of the government and the
furtherance of justice may require.
(d) Notice to government. If the circumstances of the case
indicate a substantial possibility that a claim of privilege would be
appropriate but has not been made because of oversight or lack of
knowledge, the judge shall give or cause notice to be given to the
officer entitled to claim the privilege and shall stay further proceedings a reasonable time to afford opportunity to assert a claim
of privilege.
(e) Effect of sustaining claim. If a claim of privilege is sustained in a proceeding to which the government is a party and it
appears that another party is thereby deprived of material evidence,
the judge shall make any further orders which the interests ofjustice
require, including striking the testimony of a witness, declaring a
mistrial, finding against the government upon an issue as to which
the evidence is relevant, or dismissing the action.
'See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
"'45Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509(b) & (c), 56 F.R.D. at 251-52.
46Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509(c), 56 F.R.D. at 251-252. See 2 Weinstein
& Berger, supra note 88, 509[04].
'47Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509(c), 56 F.R.D. at 251-252. The approach
adopted with respect to state secrets is consistent with United States v.
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the government not only had to show that there was a likelihood
that the requested evidence would disclose such information,
but also had to produce the evidence for inspection by the
court. 48 The court, however, could require in camera produc49
tion and inspection.1
Under Rule 509, then, once the defendant issued a subpoena to the government, the evidence would be forthcoming
at trial unless the government took the initiative and convinced
the court that a privilege existed. Under the DOJ Regulations,
however, the defendant must make a showing to his adversary,
including pretrial disclosure of work product, before the Justice
Department or a court will consider the materiality of his request. Both Rule 509 and the parallel proposals in this Article
protect the defendant from having to reveal unnecessarily important tactical information to the prosecution in order to trigger
disclosure.
Rule 509 also provided that if the government successfully
claimed that information was privileged, the trial court had to
take steps to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. 50 The
underlying reasons for congressional rejection of Rule 509 did
not include disapproval of this element of protection accorded
a defendant by the Rule.' 51
The DOJ Regulations are also arguably inconsistent with
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 52 Fed. R. Crim. P.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). It represents a compromise between the complete
abdication of judicial control which would result from accepting as final the
decision of a department officer, and the infringement upon security which
would result from a requirement of complete disclosure to the judge, even
though in camera. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 509(b), 56 F.R.D. at
254.
"8Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509(b) & (c), 56 F.R.D. at 251-52. When the
Advisory Committee drafting Rule 509 agreed to add an official information
privilege, it sought to codify the prevailing view of a qualified privilege subject
to judicial review. 2 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 88, 509[02].
" 9Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509(c), 56 F.R.D. at 251-52.
0
1"
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 509(e), 56 F.R.D. at 252.
'Congress feared that this rule governing a litigant's access to government information would make it more difficult for Congress itself to obtain
information. For a discussion of the Congressional reaction to Rule 509, see
Berger, How the Privilegefor GovernmentalInformation Met Its Watergate,
25 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 747 (1975).
'This line of reasoning once again proceeds on the assumption that the
DOJ Regulations are functionally a discovery mechanism.
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16(b) provides for broad prosecutorial pretrial discovery. In an
attempt to prevent overreaching by the prosecution, however,
Rule 16(b) makes prosecutorial discovery available only when
153
the defendant himself successfully seeks pretrial discovery.
The requirement of the regulations that a defendant submit his
theory underlying testimony to the government as a prerequisite
for consideration of his trial subpoena allows the government
to obtain pretrial information from the defendant before the
defendant is successful in obtaining trial evidence, contrary to
the express provisions of Rule 16(b). The DOJ Regulations might
have some claim to validity if they applied only to defense
requests for a pretrial deposition of a government employee. It
153See Nakell, supra note 130, at 67; Nakell, supra note 135, at 502-10.
Rule 16(b) provides as follows:
(b) Disclosure of evidence by the defendant.
(1) Information subject to disclosure.
(A) Documents and tangible objects. If the defendant requests
disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon
compliance with such request by the government, the defendant,
on request of the government, shall permit the government to
inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are
within the possession, custody, or control of the defendant and
which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at
the trial.
(B) Reports of examinations and tests. If the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule,
upon compliance with such request by the government, the defendant, on request of the government, shall permit the government
to inspect and copy or photograph any results of reports of physical
or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made
in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the
possession or control of the defendant, which the defendant intends
to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial or which were prepared
by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when
the results or reports relate to his testimony.
(2) Information not subject to disclosure. Except as to scientific or medical reports, this subdivision does not authorize the
discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal
defense documents made by the defendant, or his attorneys or
agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case,
or of statements made by the defendant, or by government or
defense witnesses, or by prospective government or defense witnesses, to the defendant, his agents or attorneys.
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goes without saying, however, that information not subject to
pretrial discovery should nevertheless be subject to disclosure
at trial unless demonstrably privileged.

Furthermore, Rule 16(b) does not provide for discovery of
the names of witnesses and specifically excludes from discovery
the statements of witnesses. 54 The DOJ Regulations require that

the defendant reveal the names of government employees he
wishes to call as witnesses and a summary of their expected
testimony. Although not designed as a discovery scheme, the
regulations elicit significant tactical information from the defendant contrary to the provisions of Rule 16. Since the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure have the force of a federal statute, 55 the housekeeping regulations requiring disclosure of a
defendant's witnesses and their expected testimony are invalid
as applied in federal criminal cases in a manner inconsistent
with law. 156
B. The DOJ Regulations and A Defendant's Sixth Amendment
Rights
In the criminal justice system, the need to develop all relevant facts to ensure that the guilty do not escape nor the
innocent suffer supports full disclosure at trial. To ensure that
' 4Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b). Rule 16(b) also excludes from prosecutorial
discovery the work product of the defendant's attorney. The work product
principle is not and cannot be properly described as a privilege. The work
product principle entitles a person to engage in a refusal, which is characteristic of a privilege; unlike a privilege, however, it must yield if sufficient
showing of need is made. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 211
(1978); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2025
(1970).
A defense lawyer's summary of what he expects a government employee
to testify to is either work product, and thus not discoverable by the terms of
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b), or it is the witness's statement and not discoverable
until after the witness has testified. Fed R. Crim. P. 16(b), 26.2(a); 2 C. Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 437 at 586 (2d ed. 1982). In either
event, it is not discoverable before trial. The DOJ Regulations, on the other
hand, require discovery of this summary before trial. This pretrial disclosure
is disadvantageous to the defense since any element of surprise is lost.
11118 U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772 (1982); 1 Wright, supra note 154, § 2; see also
Sibbach
v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13, 16 (1941)(civil rules).
156See supra note 17.
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there is full disclosure, the courts must guarantee the availability of compulsory process.

Washington v.

Texas,158

57

As the Supreme Court held in

compulsory process includes not only

the right to compel the attendance of witnesses but also the
right to introduce their testimony into evidence.
The DOJ Regulations frustrate the defendant's sixth amendment right to prepare his defense by the production and examination of witnesses. 59 The initial problem is that trial courts

have interpreted the regulations to uphold prosecution motions
to quash subpoenas for the testimony or documents requested
when defendants have failed to comply with the regulations.

Appeals courts compound the problem by elevating form-extralegal form, at that-over substance, and refusing to review
the impact of the exclusion of relevant and material information
upon the fairness of the trial, on the specious ground that absent
compliance with the regulations by the defendant there is nothing to review.

60

'57United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
58388 U.S. 14 (1967).
59
As a general matter, the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
affects the manner in which the prosecution presents its case, whereas the
compulsory process clause governs the manner in which the defendant presents his case. Because the DOJ Regulations burden the defendant in the
preparation of his case, this analysis will focus on the compulsory process
clause. Furthermore, one commentator suggests that the compulsory process
clause is more important to the defendant and can substitute for the confrontation clause. Westen, supra note 99, at 182-83.
1
6°United States v. Fricke, 684 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1250 (1983)(declining to review constitutional claims due to noncompliance and questionable relevance of information); United States v. Bizzard,
674 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 305 (1982)(defendant's claim
of constitutional violations overlooks validity of regulations established by
Touhy); United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1981)(because of
noncompliance, no constitutional claims); United States v. Estrella, 567 F.2d
1151 (Ist Cir. 1977)(burden on defendant in face of noncompliance to show
relevance and admissibility of documents); United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d
398 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977).
The defendant in Allen was convicted on 20 counts of mail fraud. On
appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in not requiring the
U.S. Attorney to testify at a hearing on the issue of pre-indictment delay
under a subpoena issued to him. At the hearing, the U.S. Attorney advised
the court that he declined to speak because he did not have permission to
testify under DOJ Regulations. Noting that the defendant made no effort to
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The courts of appeals which take this position in federal
criminal cases either cite no direct authority for this position or
cite civil cases as authority.' 6' As described above, 62 the Supreme Court's holding in Touhy does not support such a position, since the Touhy Court did not address the validity of the
DOJ procedures in terms of their impact on fifth or sixth amendment rights. Regulations which centralize decisionmaking regarding disclosure in the head of an executive department may
be valid procedural mechanisms, but when these procedures are
permitted to frustrate the exercise of constitutional rights, the
application of the regulations and their impact upon a criminal
trial must come under closer scrutiny.
The opinions which have denied review to defendants due
to noncompliance have failed to exercise such scrutiny and thus
have failed to safeguard the compulsory process rights of the
defendant. The compulsory process clause guarantees the defendant "[tihe right to offer the testimony of witnesses and to
pompel their attendance, if necessary, [which] is in plain terms
the right to present a defense ....."63 If the sanction for non-

compliance with the DOJ Regulations is the exclusion of material evidence, the defendant is deprived of his right to prepare
a defense. There is no rational basis in the evidence itself, such
submit a summary of the testimony for consideration as required by the
Regulations, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the defendant was in no position
to claim an error. The court found that in the absence of compliance with the
regulations and a decision by the Justice Department not to permit the testimony it would not address the defendant's constitutional claim.
Only if the DOJ had denied disclosure would the court reach the question
of whether such denial deprived the defendant of the constitutional guarantees
of the fifth and sixth amendments. In determining that compliance was a
prerequisite for review, the court acknowledged the validity of the DOJ Regulations
as established by the Touhy case. 554 F.2d at 406-07.
161See cases cited supra note 160. Although the Touhy case upheld the
validity of the regulations, it did not do so against a constitutional attack. The
Touly Court never examined the exclusionary effect of the regulations in
cases of noncompliance. As for the civil cases which support compliance,
they are distinguishable because they are civil cases and the sixth amendment
protections are inapplicable. See Denny v. Carey, 78 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Pa.
1978),
2
""
See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
163Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).

HeinOnline -- 19 Harv. C. R.-C. L. L. Rev. 390 1984

19841

Housekeeping Regulations

as a concern over its competency or trustworthiness, for excluding entirely the testimony or document sought.164
Furthermore, this sanction permits the government to accomplish indirectly what it is not permitted 65 to accomplish
directly: the promotion of government secrecy. If the defendant
complies with the regulations and the information sought by him
is material to his defense, the government is forced to disclose
the information or drop the prosecution. Under present case
law, however, a defendant who does not comply with the regulations is not even permitted to get to the in camera stage of
review mentioned earlier. The judiciary, in effect, has abnegated
its constitutional role. The government, therefore, is allowed to
continue a prosecution which might have been halted had an in
camera examination revealed information necessary for preparation of the defense. The negligent failure or reasoned refusal
to follow the DOJ Regulations should not be a pretext for depriving the defendant of sixth amendment rights.

66

164The Supreme Court in Washington struck down a statute which barred
the testimony of an entire category of witnesses because of their presumed
untrustworthiness. The Court found that the statute arbitrarily denied the
defendant the right to present information relevant and material to his defense
by preventing him from putting a witness on the stand who was present and
able to testify. Id. at 23.
The DOJ, with the acceptance of the courts, is doing what Texas attempted to do in Washington. Relying on confidentiality and efficiency rather
than untrustworthiness, the DOJ is barring the testimony of all government
witnesses where the defendant fails to follow the required procedures.
As discussed above, the DOJ's concerns with confidentiality and efficiency do not justify such a severe penalty when less extreme measures, such
as in camera inspections, can adequately safeguard its interests.
165See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
1
66See Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148, 1155 (5th Cir. 1972). The
court in Brasivell held that excluding a witness upon no other basis than that
he violated a sequestration order is impermissible when such an exclusion
denies a criminal defendant a fundamental constitutional right. The state contended that since the defendant had not made a proffer to the state court of
appeals of what he expected the testimony would have shown, as required by
state law, there should be no relief in the state court of appeals. According to
the Fifth Circuit, such a proffer may be desirable because it provides the
appellate court with a basis for review, but the rule cannot serve to deprive
the defendant of a constitutional right of compulsory process. Id. If noncompliance with a legitimate state rule cannot be the basis for the exclusion of
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Even if a defendant complies with the DOJ Regulations,
the procedures themselves narrow his sixth amendment rights
in a further respect. The regulations stipulate that as a prereq-

uisite for obtaining the testimony of a government witness, the
defendant must submit a summary of the expected testimony
which will define the scope of the testimony at trial if the gov-

ernment permits the witness to appear.

67

Once a witness takes

the stand, his testimony may reveal other areas of relevant
inquiry; yet, the regulations seek to limit testimony to what the

defendant can specify in advance of the trial. The only basis for
such a limitation is to avoid disclosure of privileged information.

Case law reveals, however, that once a court determines that a
witness possesses evidence which is relevant and material to
the determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence, the defendant's sixth amendment right to elicit testimony, whether on
direct or cross-examination, prevails over all testimonial privileges and forces the government to disclose or to abandon its
prosecution. 68 This line of reasoning is premised upon the assumption, supported by the DOJ Regulation in effect at the time
of Touhy, that the trial court has the authority to require the

testimony which is important to the defendant's case, neither should noncom-.
pliance with the DOJ Regulations be a basis for exclusion. It is possible for a
trial court or a court of appeals to gather information from the defendant
which will enable it to determine the relevance of the desired testimony. The
court need not rely on formal submissions.
1628 C.F.R. § 16.23(c). Although this provision does not explicitly limit
testimony to the summary submitted, as does the provision governing testimony in a case to which the government is not a party, see 28 C.F.R.
§ 16.22(c), the scheme of advance approval implies that the testimony will be
so limited.
''Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process:A Unified Theory of
Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 581 n.38 (1978). If the
evidence the defendant is seeking would impeach a witness, then the government must choose between preserving the confidential nature of the privileged
information and thus striking the testimony of the witness or standing on the
testimony and foregoing the confidentiality of the information. See, e.g., Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974).
If the evidence the defendant seeks would tend to contradict the elements
of the charge against him, the government must drop the prosecution or forego
the confidentiality of the information. See, e.g., Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61;
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 670-72 (1957). See also Reynolds, 345
U.S. at 12.
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government to disclose its evidence in camera1 69 to enable the
court to determine whether the arguably privileged information
is relevant to the defendant's case before having to decide
whether the privilege should yield to the defendant's sixth
1 70
amendment rights.
In Roviaro v. United States, 171 the Supreme Court, in response to the government's claim of privilege regarding an informer's identity, concluded that the informer was an important
witness whom the defendant had a right to confront. The Court
held that if the government refused to reveal the informer's
identity in order to preserve his usefulness as an informer, the
case would have to be dropped. 172 While recognizing that the
government had a legitimate interest in protecting its sources of
information, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant
had a superior right to prepare his defense.173 Whether the privilege claimed by the Justice Department involves an informer's
identity, an employee's perceptions or conduct, or an interdepartmental memorandum, case law holds that the privilege cannot extend so far as to allow concealment of exculpatory evi174
dence from the defendant in a criminal case.
The compulsory process clause does not deny the government's interest in secrecy or efficiency-promoting internal regulations, but it prohibits the government from invoking directly,
or indirectly through prejudicial disclosure procedures, a privilege at the defendant's expense. 75 Limiting the scope of trial
examination to the testimony of a witness which the defendant
can predict impairs the defendant's right to gather information
169See
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
170See Westen, supra note 168, at 581 n.38.
171353 U.S. 53 (1957).
'72Id. at 61.
173
d. at 60-61.
1741d. The compulsory process clause applies not only to the informer
privilege, but to any government privilege that has the effect of concealing
information from the defendant. See United States v. Powell, 156 F. Supp.
526, 530 (N.D. Cal. 1957), mandamus denied, 260 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 734, 738 (S.D. Cal. 1952),
affd sub nom. Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955), rev'd on
other grounds, 354 U.S. 298 (1958).
In most cases the courts appear to say that the defendant's interest
overrides
contrary testimonial privileges. Westen, supra note 168, at 626 n. 164.
175Westen, supra note 99, at 163.
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either to establish directly his innocence or to impeach a witness. If the rationale for this requirement, protection of potentially privileged information, would eventually be overridden by
sixth amendment interests, it is difficult to see any justification
for the requirement.
Conclusion
The burdens imposed by federal executive branch housekeeping regulations in exposing the defendant's ideas to the
prosecution prior to trial and limiting his right to prepare and
present a defense are unreasonable and ultimately interfere with
the reliability of guilt determination at trial. Contrary to the
authorizing statute and the sixth amendment, the regulations
work to prevent disclosure of information. They are thus similar
to but lack the underlying justification of the alibi witness exclusion sanction at issue in Taliaferro.
The housekeeping regulations were not authorized by Congress to confer a privilege upon the Justice Department to withhold information; their limited role was to create an efficient
mechanism for centralizing decisionmaking which may result in
the assertion of a privilege. In cases where the government
might wish to assert a privilege, however, the regulations actually defeat efficient operations because they do not allow for
timely and relevant judicial input. Because the DOJ could never
successfully assert a government privilege and still proceed
against a defendant in a criminal trial without disclosure of
demonstrably relevant information, it should not be permitted
to achieve indirectly this same result by operation of its procedural regulations.
Moreover, as the Buford court pointed out:
There is, since 1974 [Nixon], no longer any doubt that
the trial court in a criminal case has the power, indeed
the "manifest duty," to marshall the evidence and vindicate the constitutional guarantees of a criminal defendant's rights "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him" and "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in favor of him .

..."176

7158 Ga. App. at 767, 282 S.E.2d at 137 (1981)(citing sixth amendment).
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The trial court not only has the power and duty to require
disclosure of information, but also can do so in a way that
protects the interests of the government in assuring efficient
government operations. In an adversarial setting where the prosecution commences its action from a superior vantage point, it
should not be permitted to require the defendant to follow executive branch rules in order to exercise his constitutional
rights. The procedural obligations, requirements, and safeguards
embodied in proposed Rule 509 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, including in camera proffers to the trial judge, should be
judicially adopted.
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